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Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands1
Sophie Scholten and Paul Minderhoud
Radboud University Nijmegen
Abstract
This article attempts to put carrier sanctions policies in a broad perspective by looking at the immigration
context, the rationale behind the policy, the changing character of borders and the regulatory environment
of this policy. Carrier sanction legislation can be understood as a remote control instrument, which is supple-
mentary to controls before and at the border and internal controls, whereby the concept of the border as a
line between states is abandoned. The second part of the article focuses on the implementation of the carrier
sanctions policy in the Netherlands. The Dutch government tries to overcome the principal-agent dilemma
arising from involving a third party in enforcement, by installing a system of 'contiguous measures', both
negative and positive, to stimulate carriers to perform controls on their passengers' documents. Responsi-
bilities are imposed on carriers but the state, by using 'soft' and 'hard touch' legislation, remains in control.
Keywords
carrier sanctions; borders; third-party liability; contiguous measures; regulation
Affidavit of the Master or Commanding Officer, or First or Second Officer
1, 0. Cippers, Master of the %ziser Widhelm H' from Bremen, do solemnly sincerely, and truly swear
that I have caused the surgeon of said vessel sailing therewith or the surgeon employed by the owners
thereof, to make a physical and oral examination of each and all of the aliens named in the foregoing Lists
or Manifest Sheets, 30 in number, and that from the report of said surgeon and from my own investiga-
tion, I believe that no one of the said aliens is an idiot, or imbecile, or a feeble-minded person, or insane
person, or a pauper, or is likely to become a public charge, or is afflicted with tuberculosis or with a loath-
some or dangerous contagious disease, or is a person who has been convicted of, or who admits having
committed a felony or other crime or misdemeanour involving moral turpitude, or is a polygamist or
one admitting belief in the practice of polygamy, or an anarchist, or under promise or agreement, express
or implied, to perform labor in the United States, or a prostitute, or a woman or girl coming to the
United States for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, and that also, according
to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information in said Lists or Manifests concerning each of
said aliens named therein is correct and true in every respect. 0. Ciippers, Commanding Officer
Sworn lo before me this third day of July, 1907, at New York
R.S. Biglin, Immigration Officer.2
This article falls within CHALLENGE - The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security -
a research project funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission's Director-
ate-General for Research (www.libertysecurity.org).
2) Affidavit from the Master of the 'Kaiser Wilhelm II' arriving in New York on 3 July 1907. Retrieved
from the Ellis Island website, last visited 11 February 2008, www.ellisisland.org.
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1. Introduction
Ever since nation states have started to control and regulate migration, govern-
ments have tried to share this difficult task with private organisations and semi-
public bodies. This article focuses on the way in which private transporters have
become involved in the process of migration control.
The affidavit above illustrates that the involvement of carriers in immigration
control has not been a recent development. Already in the nineteenth century, the
US government introduced legislation intended to restrain shipping companies
from transporting passengers who, because of ill (mental) health or immoral
intentions, were considered undesired immigrants. This induced transatlantic
shipping companies to perform immigration controls prior to embarkation.3 This
example shows that in immigration control the sharing of migration control tasks
between government agencies, semi-public bodies and private companies was not
uncommon.
During the past decades, controlling migration flows has become an increas-
ingly important political issue in western European countries. Especially con-
trolling 'illegal' or 'undocumented' immigration is prioritised. According to
Tholen, it seems that nowadays migration and security is all that Europe is
about.4 The importance of immigration control as a political issue grew in the
1980s when the number of immigrants and asylum-seekers travelling to western
Europe, rapidly increased, a growing number of whom was from outside Europe
and not in possession of the necessary travel documents. In response, govern-
ments introduced tougher immigration control mechanisms designed to check
the flow of immigrants and, specifically, asylum-seekers.5 One of these measures
was the introduction of carrier sanctions legislation whereby a fine can be imposed
on carriers who transport passengers who are not in possession of the required
travel documents.6
This policy was not just developed nationally but also in cooperation between
EU Member States. In 1990 the obligation to sanction carriers was included in
the Schengen Implementing Convention; in 2001 an EU Directive was adopted,
harmonising the financial penalties for carriers. The latest developments have
been the adoption of an EC Directive in 2004, forcing carriers to gather Advanced
Passenger Information (API) data and forward them to immigration authorities
of the country of destination before departure,7 and the proposal of the European
Commission to have air carriers gather and forward to the authorities, Personal
Zolberg 1999 and 2003; Wilmink 1893; De Marez Oyens 1886.
4) Tholen 2005.
5) Feller 1989, p. 50.
o For an overview of carrier sanctions policies in Europe, see Cruz 1995.
7 EC Directives 2001/51/EC, OJ L 187, 10.7.2001, p. 45 and 2004/82/EC, OJ L 261, 6.8.2004,
p. 24.
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Name Record (PNR) data of passengers flying to and from the EU.8 Through this
increasingly strict legislation, private carriers have been compelled to check docu-
ments, to gather and forward passenger data and to refuse to transport undocu-
mented or not adequately documented passengers. Transport companies and
their staff have traditionally been one of the main targets for sharing the burden
of migration control, and through the policy of carrier liability, private transport-
ers are forced more and more to assume responsibility for the admissibility of the
passengers they intend to transport.
There has been a trend towards privatisation, de-regulation and self-regulation
in various branches of business in the past twenty years, accompanied by an
increasing focus in literature and research on changes from 'command and con-
trol' regulatory models, to regulatory models where the State is no longer 'rowing'
but 'steering'.' This development toward involving non-State actors in different
areas of enforcement can be interpreted as part of a more general transformation
of government taking place in contemporary societies in the last thirty years,
where a centralized top-down system of State control has moved to a system of
de-centred networks of governance. ° In these de-centred networks, public and
private actors are involved in both formal and informal practices aimed at reach-
ing policy goals.
In this article, we will focus on the carrier sanctions policy and explore how it
can be seen from a regulatory perspective. In the case of carrier sanctions, a pri-
vate actor is involved in a process that has always been central to State control:
immigration control. The involvement of transporters in immigration control
cannot be solely attributed to a transformation of government to governance - as
we have seen, private carriers have been involved in migration control for more
than two centuries. However, it is not unlikely that the present carrier sanctions
policy and its development in the past decades have been influenced by this shift
towards governance. Can we discern a move away from command and control
models of regulation towards forms of governance in this area?
In the first part of the article, we will pay attention to the developing carrier
sanctions policy in a broader context: the context of immigration control. In the
second part, we will discuss implementing measures concerning carrier sanctions
8) COM (2007)654, final, 6 November 2007. PNR (Passenger Name Record) data is more extensive
than API (Advanced Passenger Information). API normally contains information from the machine read-
able zone (MRZ) of a passport: name, passport number, nationality, date of birth in combination with
flight details: place of entry into EU, plane code, departure and arrival time, number of passengers and
point of embarkation. PNR data can also encompass for example credit card details, meal preferences,
medical data, etc. The aim of Directive 2004/82/EC was to fight illegal immigration whereas the new
proposal of the Commission is aimed at the fight against terrorism and organized crime.
9) Ayling and Grabosky 2006.
0 Van Kersbergen en Van Waarden 2004; Mazerolle and Ransley 2005.
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in the Netherlands. We will thereby focus on the way in which the Dutch govern-
ment tries to overcome principal-agent problems and make carriers comply with
their imposed responsibilities.
2. The 'Why' of Carrier Sanctions
The first question that arises when looking at carrier sanctions policies is: why are
governments forcing responsibilities concerning migration control onto private
parties? This question is all the more interesting since immigration control has
always been a core aspect of State sovereignty. Torpey has shown how gaining
control over movement has been essential in building nation States and how
States have gradually "stripped private entities of the power to authorize and for-
bid movement and gathered that power unto them selves".11 This "monopolisa-
tion of the legitimate means of movement" by States also meant that they were
successful in "determining who 'belonged' and who did not".12 Yet, contrary to
this monopolisation, in the case of migration, governments are delegating these
core tasks and responsibilities concerning immigration control to private actors.
As a result of the developing carrier sanctions regime, airline personnel have in
fact been forced to take over certain tasks from immigration officers and have
become the 'sheriffs deputies', they are executing immigration controls on behest
of the State.' 3
2.1 Controlling Immigration: Loss of Control?
In the debate concerning migration, there has been a lot of discussion on the
question whether or not States have lost control over immigration. Some scholars
argue that States have almost never succeeded in managing migration thus far.14
Cornelius et al. have argued that there is a "limited effectiveness of most attempts
by governments [...] to intervene in the migration process linking them to Third
World labour exporting countries". 5 Also Cornelius and Salehyan argue that the
United States are losing control in trying to control 'unwanted' immigration
through strict border control measures and that alternative approaches such as
labour market policies may have more effect than stricter border controls.16 How-
ever, with regard to labour migration policies, De Lange found that the Dutch
authorities mostly failed in regulating labour migration over the last 60 years, and
11 Torpey 2000, p. 8.
12) Torpey 2000, p. 20.
'3' Torpey 2000, p. 9.
"o Van Amersfoort 1996.
'5 Cornelius et al. 2004.
'6 Cornelius 2005; Cornelius and Salehyan 2007.
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have in that same period lost control over the regulation of labour migration to
the EU.17 According to Sassen, governments have lost control over immigration
under the influence of globalisation. 8
Andreas argues that far from disappearing, many borders are being reasserted
and remade through ambitious and innovative State efforts to regulate the tran-
snational movement of people.19 Instead of a loss of sovereignty, Andreas says,
European border controls reflect a multilateral 'pooling of sovereignty'.2 ° Also
Geddes states that through EU cooperation and integration States have consoli-
dated and reasserted their ability to regulate international migration.21 Dauvergne
even argues that control over the movement of people has become the last bastion
of sovereignty, although she does not suggest that States are also always effective
in their migration control.
22
In many of these debates, the terms sovereignty and control are used, some-
times meaning in essence the same: since effective controls, and therefore the
ability to determine who is allowed access to the territory and who is not, can be
argued to be central to a State's sovereignty, the concepts of control and sover-
eignty are linked. Sassen for example states that the mere existence of undocu-
mented immigrants signifies an erosion of sovereignty.23 Dauvergne agrees, saying
that "illegal immigration is an affront to sovereignty because it is evidence that a
nation is not in control of its borders".
24
Guiraudon and Lahav also pay attention to the coherence between sovereignty
and the ability to control immigration and argue that States may have surren-
dered a part of their sovereignty by sharing competences with other States in
immigration control, but have done so to meet national policy goals, regaining
sovereignty in another sense: capability to rule. 25 An example is the way Member
States until May 2004 could initiate an EC Directive. France for example initi-
ated the Directive on the harmonisation of carrier sanctions; 26 this way it could
use European cooperation to try to improve its control over immigration. Mem-
ber States have also used the European level to see their national wishes concern-
ing migration fulfilled. For example, the Dutch Government wanted to introduce
penalties for carriers but was always met with resistance in Dutch Parliament.
7) De Lange 2007, p. 401.
'8 Sassen 1996.
'9) Andreas 2000, p. 2.
20) Andreas 2000, p. 3.
2') Geddes 2001.
22) Dauvergne 2004.
23) Sassen 1996, p. 64.
24) Dauvergne 2004, p. 598. It may be questioned whether, in general, governments expect their legisla-
tion to be 'foolproof'. It seems that issues relating to immigration policy are more complicated. When
immigration laws are not foolproof it is taken as evidence of failing sovereignty.
25) Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, p. 164.
'6) 2001/51/EC OJ L 187, 10.7.2001, p. 45.
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Through the implementation of the Schengen Implementing Convention how-
ever - in which negotiations the Dutch were also involved - the Dutch govern-
ment could finally introduce a system of carrier sanctions. These examples support
Geddes' argument that European cooperation and integration have helped Mem-
ber States consolidate and reassert their ability to regulate international migration
through the use of new EU-level institutional venues.
27
There are different views on whether or not the State has lost control. There
seems to be little agreement on the issue. It is not always clear to what kind of
migration authors are referring: labour migration, irregular migration or other-
wise? In this case, we would like to refer to Freeman who argues that the view that
States are losing control is unwarranted, and that migration should be disaggre-
gated to avoid undisciplined speculation.28 In this paper, the focus is on the con-
trol of undesirable migration - in the sense of undocumented arrivals - through
the use of carrier sanctions.
2.2 Delegating Immigration Control to Private Actors
Whether or not States are able to control their borders, it is clear that they try to
do so vigorously. The inclusion of carriers in immigration control is an attempt to
control unwanted immigration. Lavenex describes how European policies have
focused on the repression of undesirable immigration flows by externalising con-
trols, instead of addressing the factors that lead people to leave their countries of
origin through a preventive comprehensive approach. She states that the locus of
control has shifted further away from the physical border and has become 'remote
control', 29 mainly through coordinating visa policies in the Schengen group, by
installing carriers' liability regimes and by placing liaison officers at airports in
countries of origin to check that documents are thoroughly examined.30 Accord-
ing to Guiraudon, the passing of tasks from government to other actors consti-
tutes a 'de-nationalization' of immigration control. Guiraudon and Lahav
distinguish between different forms of 'shifting' of competence and responsibili-
ties away from the State; shifting up (e.g. to EU level), down (e.g. to regional
level) and out (to private actors).31
Limiting Costs and Increasing Efficiency
In answering the question why governments are prepared to delegate their respon-
sibilities in the area of migration control, it can be helpful to look at privatisation
27) Geddes 2001, p. 21.
2) Freeman 1994, p. 17.
19) Lavenex 2006; see for the use of 'remote control' Zolberg 2003, also Guiraudon 2001 and 2002,
Guiraudon and Lahav 2000.
0) Lavenex 2006, p. 334.
" Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; see also Guiraudon 2001.
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in immigration control from a costs-benefits point of view. In the case of control-
ling the entrance of undocumented passengers, bounded rationality, together
with a complex environment makes it difficult for governments to ensure that no
Iunwanted' immigrants gain access to their territories. Therefore, governments
co-opt private transport companies to help them deter wrongdoers (more)
effectively. Following an economic reasoning, actors (in this case government)
will choose to delegate tasks if this will result in higher efficiency and lower costs.3"
By 'privatising' control tasks to private transporters, governments avoid having to
employ and train staff to execute control functions abroad - if that would be at
all possible seeing that this will severely affect a third State's sovereignty. Accord-
ing to Ayling and Grabosky, the continuing development of the involvement of
third party enforcement indicates that States recognise they cannot 'do it
alone'.33
Also, by shifting control mechanisms to a private actor that operates before the
physical border, the costs of accommodation, assessing asylum claims and expul-
sion can be reduced. Thus, by using a private transporter to execute part of the
controls, governments have simultaneously 'externalised' part of the costs associ-
ated with migration control to private actors.34 This does not mean there will be
no costs for the State associated with this policy. As will be described in the sec-
ond part of this paper, States invest in installing control mechanisms to assert that
these duties are indeed performed by carriers.
Circumventing Constraints
As illustrated in the introduction, the involvement of private actors in migration
control as such is not a new phenomenon. According to Guiraudon, the phe-
nomenon itself might not be new, the way it is now used as a response to the
constraints that migration control policy faces in a national setting is a novelty:
immigration control through 'remote control' is now being used to "circumvent
legal constraints absent in the early twentieth century" Consider, for example,
the prohibition concerning refoulement which was introduced with the Geneva
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). By preventing migration at
the source and therefore by making sure that would-be asylum-seekers do not
reach the territory of receiving countries, governments no longer have to refuse
possible asylum-seekers and other migrants at the border. They no longer need to
expel failed asylum claimants - with the risk of violating the prohibition of
refoulement - they simply make sure that they cannot reach the border.
32) Willamson 1981.
3 Garland 1996, cited by Ayling and Grabosky 2006.
3 Guiraudon and Lahav 2000.
35) Guiraudon 2002, p. 195.
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Lahav similarly argues that 'shifting' competences and responsibility and
involving other actors such as carriers, has been governments' strategy to "extend
their realm of action and overcome certain constraints".16 By changing the gate-
keepers to include private, local and international/supranational agents, govern-
ments have enlarged the 'migration playing field' and so have been able to "solve
the control dilemma in ways that can at once appease public anxiety over migra-
tion and security, short-circuit judicial and normative constraints (by involving
actors that are not bound by the international rules concerning human rights
protection) and still promote trade and tourist flows".3 7 Thus, Guiraudon and
Lahav argue western European States are adapting to constraints by adopting
Iremote control' measures.38
2.3 From 'Physical'to "Metaphorical'Borders
Carrier sanctions' measures should also be interpreted by analysing the changing
character of border controls. As Lavenex argued, the locus of control has shifted
further away from the physical border and has become 'remote control'.3 9
Carrier sanctions are not the only control mechanisms away from the actual
'physical' border, the old border line. When travelling to the European Union
from a third country, travellers often find that the effective border of the Euro-
pean Union does not coincide with the geographical line around its territory. It is
not the border patrols at the outer borders that one (at first) encounters.4" On
their way to an EU Member State, third country nationals will have to deal with
various external and internal control dimensions. External controls being the
more visible control mechanisms that States use to control entry before departure
or arrival, through measures such as visa requirements and carrier sanctions, and
internal controls - those control measures that may be exercised on non-nationals
from their first entry into the territory to their naturalization.4'
Before travelling to the European Union, nationals of many countries have to
report to the consular representation of the country of destination to obtain a
visa. This allows the immigration authorities of the country of destination to
already perform checks whilst the traveller is still in his or her country of depar-
ture. Then, at different points in travelling, through different control mecha-
nisms, this person on the move can be checked by various actors, positioned
strategically, who ascertain if the migrant is admissible to the country of destina-
tion. This constitutes not only a territorial but also a temporal relocation of
6 Lahav 2003, p. 89.
31) Lahav 2003, p. 89.
31) Guiraudon and Lahav 2000.
19) Lavenex 2006.
40) Tholen 2005, p. 330.
41) Brochmann 1999.
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control. Externally, intelligence agencies, such as Immigration Liaison Officers,
collect information on migratory flows, and share this information with other
organisations. At the consular services, there will be physical contact with the
migrant for the first time. Next are the controls executed by private transporters
such as shipping companies or airlines, possibly advised by Immigration Liaison
Officers, in pre-boarding checks. At the point of arrival, gate-checks can be exe-
cuted directly after disembarking. Then, at the airport, the migrant can be
checked by immigration authorities. Finally, there are internal controls in the
country of destination to check that no unwanted immigrants remain on the
territory. Examples are the requirement of residence and work permits and
inspection of work sites, and wherever immigrants encounter welfare authorities
etc. Thus, controls are not situated randomly; remote control is supplementary
to controls at the borders and to internal controls in the receiving country. A
system of border management has been developed where border control is de-
territorialized, and the concept of the 'physical border' as a line between States is
abandoned. As Brochmann has also described, internal and external controls
constitute a continuum, with a different mix of internal and external controls in
each country.
With the 'externalisation' and 'de-territorialization' of immigration control,
governments have in fact distanced themselves - legally and geographically - from
immigration control: control is no longer conducted in the country itself but
from a distance, in the country of origin or transit. A consequence of moving bor-
der control away from the State is that controls and the way they are executed are
no longer subject to democratic control mechanisms. It is, for example, not clear
how many passengers are being refused by airlines. Various authors have raised
questions concerning the lack ofjudicial remedies, democratic control and account-
ability.4 2 Salter even claims that the lack of judicial remedies - which are available
in a face-to-face asylum claim - is an expression of the fact that "tactics [are used]
rather than laws, and even (...) laws themselves [are used] as tactics".43 An example
of the effects of moving borders can be found in the judgment on the Roma Rights
case in the United Kingdom," where one of the Law Lords argues that the claim
42) See for example Salter 2007; Den Boer 2004.
43) Salter 2007.
44) Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma
Rights Centre and others (Appellants) [2004] UKHL 55. In 2001, the Czech Republic agreed that the UK
could station immigration officers at Prague Airport to screen and possibly refuse passengers travelling to
the UK. This practice was challenged as incompatible with the obligations of the UK under the Geneva
Convention (1951) and Protocol (1967) relating to the Status of Refugees and under customary interna-
tional law. The appellants also challenged the procedures as involving unjustifiable discrimination on
racial grounds. On 9 December 2004, the UK House of Lords found the UK government to have dis-
criminated under national legislation on racial grounds against Czech Roma in preventing them from
travelling to the UK in order to stop them from claiming asylum upon arrival.
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for asylum brought forward in this case failed since the asylum-seekers had not
presented themselves at the frontier of the United Kingdom, save in a 'highly
metaphorical sense'.45 One of the Law Lords thus made a clear distinction between
physical and metaphorical borders. According to Kesby, this emphasis on the
geographical border denies other more subtle forms of borders. Nowadays, bor-
ders are 'ubiquitous'.
46
In policy documents, we also see this kind of 'de-territorialization' of the bor-
der used more and more explicitly. In 2003, the Dutch Advisory Committee on
Aliens Affairs (ACVZ) strongly recommended that the Dutch Government
adopt a strategy of border control shaped as concentric circles as an alternative
to the 'classic' border control mechanisms.47 Arranging mechanisms of border
control as concentric circles has also been discussed in the context of the Euro-
pean Union's policy to manage migration. The Austrian Presidency drafted a
controversial Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy in 1998 in which
it proposed to replace the model of 'fortress Europe' with a model of 'concentric
circles'. 48 In this model of concentric circles, the EU constitutes the inner circle.
The neighbouring countries were thought of as constituting the second circle
that "should gradually be linked into a similar system which should be brought
increasingly into line with the first circle's standards (...)".49 A third circle of
States - e.g. Turkey and North Africa - "will then concentrate primarily on tran-
sit checks and combating facilitator networks".50 Eliminating push factors was
suggested as a task for countries forming the fourth circles: China, and countries
in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Shaping border control in concen-
tric circles would then mean that surrounding States would be transformed into
'buffer zones',51 either restricting migration to the inner circle by installing con-
trol mechanisms or by absorbing parts of the migratory flows. At the time the
Austrian Delegation drafted this paper, the idea of forming concentric circles of
control provoked a lot of resistance, although presently it seems to have become
much more acceptable to policy makers. This concept mentioned in the Draft
Strategy Paper is now replicated in the internal security regime and in the coop-
eration of the EU with third countries concerning asylum and migration.5 2 The
EU Council of Ministers even talks of 'external borders global management'
45) Kesby 2007.
4) Balibar 2002, cited in Kesby 2007.
47 ACVZ 2003. The ACVZ is the Dutch committee that advises the Dutch Government on migration
policy. This committee was established in accordance with Article 2 of the Miens Act 2000.
I8) From the Presidency to the K4 Committee, Doc 9809/98, CK4, Brussels 1 July 1998, this confidential
paper leaked in September 1998. A model of concentric circles is suggested under points 60 and 61.
49) Doc 9809/98, CK4, Brussels 1 July 1998.
50) Doc 9809/98, CK4, Brussels 1 July 1998.
5 Collinson 1996.
52) Lindstrom 2005, p. 590.
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which must contain measures and actions in third countries.53 In the Hague
Programme, 54 reference is also made to a 'continuum of security measures con-
cerning the management of migration flows and "for the prevention and control
of crime, in particular terrorism.
55
3. The 'How' of Carrier Sanctions
In the previous sections, we have provided a perspective on the reasoning behind
the policy of carrier sanctions and on the context of immigration control. Based
on reasons of cost reduction, higher efficiency and circumventing certain con-
straints, governments have delegated responsibilities concerning immigration
controls to private carriers. Thereby, we have to take into consideration that this
development has not taken place in a vacuum. The development of the 'remote
control' instrument of carrier sanctions fits into the changing character of border
controls in which circles of risk filters have been developed and placed strategi-
cally. It brings us to the question of how this policy is carried out. In answering
this question, we will mainly focus on the relationship between carrier and gov-
ernment: are carriers victims, upon whom this policy is enforced by mechanisms
of command and control or is there reciprocity in the relationship with room for
negotiation on a more equal basis?
3.1 Third Party Liability
Systems of carrier sanctions are a way of involving a third party in enforcement.
This kind of third party involvement, which is characterised by the fact that the
private parties whose help is enlisted, are neither the primary authors, nor the
(direct) beneficiaries of the misconduct they police, is referred to by Gilboy as
a thirdparty liability system. Such a liability system is in contrast to other forms
of third party involvement in which third parties sometimes also stand to
benefit from their cooperation with government.5 6 In third party liability sys-
tems, third parties are used as 'sheriffs' deputies' or as 'cops on the beat',5 7 they
are made responsible for certain tasks, while control remains with the State.
According to Gilboy, we can discern third-party liability practices through three
characteristics:
") Doc. 5174/03, 9 January 2003, p. 2.
4) The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union. Annex 1
to the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, November 2004.
55) Doc. 16054/04, 13 December 2004, p. 16.
56 Gilboy 1998, p. 135, citing Kraakman 1986.
57) Torpey 2000, p. 9; Kraakman 1986, p. 53.
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1. Private actors are compelled to help deter misconduct by others;
2. Civil and /or criminal sanctions exist in case the third party fails to perform
its duties (it should be noted that the third party is sanctioned rather than
the original trespasser):
3. Little or no compensation is provided to cover the costs of performing duties.
Third party liability is used not just in immigration control but in a variety of
situations where misconduct cannot be detected except at great public cost. The
help of private parties can vary from disclosing private information to law enforc-
ers (cf. transfer of passenger data) to obstructing certain conduct (denying board-
ing to inadmissible passengers). Examples are the compulsory reporting of
unusually high numbers of people with symptoms of infectious diseases by Dutch
doctors, or the compulsory reporting of unusual transactions by banks and nota-
ries but also by car dealers, antique sellers, etc. In immigration control the 'mis-
conduct' is interpreted as undocumented or inadequately documented travellers,
trying to access a State's territory without being in possession of a (valid) passport
or visa. The fact that undocumented or inadequately documented passengers
claim asylum has been identified by various governments as an abuse of the asy-
lum system. Mazerolle and Ransley focus their research on the way in which third
parties are involved in policing; they state that central to third party policing is
the use of a range of civil, criminal and regulatory rules and laws, to encourage (or
force) third parties into taking some crime control responsibility. 8
Ayling and Grabosky make a clear distinction between 'mandatory action' and
'mandatory reporting' in the involvement of third parties in what they call 'polic-
ing by command'. Mandatory action is where a third party is required by law to
undertake certain actions in the advancement of law enforcement (for example,
the checking of documents by carriers). Mandatory reporting is described as the
requirement that a third party provides information on specific activities to law
enforcement, or other regulatory agencies.5 1 In the case of carrier liability, the
State is coercing the carrier into taking mandatory action. And, due to new obli-
gations for carriers in the EU, air carriers are now also responsible for gathering
passenger data and forwarding these to their immigration authorities of the coun-
try of destination before departure. Carriers are thus obligated to act and report.
Carriers' position in the third party liability system in immigration control can
be characterised as that of 'gatekeepers'. Gatekeepers are defined by Kraakman as
third parties involved in enforcement because they are able to disrupt misconduct
by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers. 60 This is different than, for
instance, imposing liability on third parties to 'blow the whistle' on wrongdoers
"8 Mazerolle and Ransley 2005, p. 3.
'9 Ayling and Grabosky 2006, p. 423.
60 Kraakman 1986.
HeinOnline  -- 10 Eur. J. Migration & L. 134 2008
S. Scholten, P Minderhoud / European Journal of Migration and Law 10 (2008) 123-147 135
or discharge or otherwise punish wrongdoers. In this case, the withholding of
cooperation is the refusal to transport a passenger when the carrier suspects that
that passenger might be refused entry into the country of destination.
Some private entities are especially well suited to deter lawbreaking behaviour;
since they have 'access' to the misconduct they are asked to prevent, they may be
considered as 'key access points' to it.6' This is certainly the case with interna-
tional carriers: they have a powerful position in preventing undocumented pas-
sengers from boarding the carrier, and thus have a powerful position in preventing
the 'misconduct'. Furthermore, carriers play a role in facilitating the law-breaking
behaviour; they will prefer to sell as many seats as possible on a plane or boat.
Therefore, carriers are not only essential to detection and control of law-breaking
behaviour, but can at the same time facilitate such behaviour.62
By shifting tasks to private actors operating before the border, the relationship
between government and carriers is fundamentally affected. Carriers have not
been anxious to assume the control tasks of immigration authorities, as will be
illustrated by several court cases on this issue in the Netherlands. As commercial
transporters, their objective is to transport as many travellers as possible in a way
that is most cost efficient. Being made responsible for checking their passengers'
documents, has meant an obligation for carriers to invest in training of employ-
ees, and possibly the hiring of extra staff. Moreover, one of the consequences is
the refusal of those passengers not in possession of the required documents.
Through the carriers' liability regime, the passenger is actually transformed into a
potential economic risk to the carrier, one which the carrier will want to diminish
as much as possible. Under threat of considerable financial sanctions, carriers
have reluctantly agreed to assume the imposed role of immigration officers.63
Despite the carrier's reluctance, immigration authorities will try to make sure
that carriers do comply with their policy. Governments insist that it is important
to control their borders and especially to prevent illegal immigration. The carrier's
position is very different from the State's in this third-party liability system. Car-
riers have no interest - apart from avoiding liability - in refusing passengers who
do not possess proper travel documents. This presents governments with a prin-
cipal-agent problem: how can the government (principal) ensure that the carrier
(agent) complies with its goals?6' In the case of carrier liability, private carriers are
obliged by law to perform control duties. States have tried through (economic)
coercion, to convince carriers to perform these with diligence. With sanctions,
the State hopes to influence the private party's motives and interests through
reducing the expected value of non-compliance.65
61) Gilboy 1998.
6') Kraakman 1986; Gilboy 1997 and 1998.
63) Cruz 1995, p. 3; Nicholson 1997.
6 Williamson 1985; for the use of the principal-agent approach concerning carrier sanctions, see also
Guiraudon 2001.
65) Ayling and Grabosky 2006, p. 422.
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The term 'carrier sanctions' suggests that mainly sanctions are deployed in per-
suading carriers, however, we must keep in mind that the relationship between
the State and the other actors involved might not be one-sided. In her research,
Gilboy has shown that complex dependencies can exist between the various par-
ties involved in third-party liability systems in immigration control.66 How these
relationships develop and take shape, is partly dependent on the extent of the
interdependencies between the actors; for example, when carriers are not obliged
(by law) to act in a certain way, the relationship between officials and carriers
becomes much more of an exchange relationship "in which both actors come to
expect quidpro quo exchanges".67
This is also supported by Ayling and Grabosky's study in which they argue that,
coercion through 'command', unlike the use of physical force, gives citizens - in
this case private organisations - choices about the extent of their cooperation.68
The State will want to increase the extent of that cooperation as much as possible.
Third party liability systems thus can become, depending on the situation, "occa-
sions for mutual dependencies and exchange between public and private enti-
ties".69 As we will see below, the financial sanctions imposed on carriers are being
supplemented with various instruments and strategies to make sure that carriers
indeed perform the control tasks. 'Monitoring' mechanisms are operated by gov-
ernments in order to 'stimulate' private transporters to execute their control tasks.
We will illustrate this by describing the policy concerning the enforcement of
carrier sanctions in the Netherlands.
3.2 Implementing Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands
Legislation
As in other European countries, carriers transporting passengers by air, water or
land to the Netherlands are responsible for checking their passengers' documenta-
tion. Passengers without the proper documentation: passport, visa, etc. should in
principle not be carried. In the Netherlands, these obligations are laid down in
the Aliens Act 2000, the Aliens Decree and the Aliens Regulation as well as in the
Aliens Circular which contains the Guidelines for Carriers, and in the Guideline
concerning the criminal prosecution of carriers.
Penalties
In case passengers have been brought to the territory and are refused entry into
the Netherlands, the carrier can be held responsible for the passengers' return, for
the costs associated with the stay of inadmissibles and finally, the carrier can also
w Gilboy 1997.
67) Gilboy 1997, p. 507 (italics added).
6 Ayling and Grabosky 2006.
69) Gilboy 1997, p. 525.
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be fined for not complying with its 'duty of due care'. 70 The maximum fine in the
Netherlands can amount to E 18,500, although in most cases a settlement is
offered first of E 3,000 (for first offenders). 71 Sanctions are used to penalise the
carrier after the fact. The government however wants to avoid that inadmissible
passengers reach the territory. Moreover, the policy has changed the relationship
between private transporters and their passengers. The carrier, first the client's
servant, has now become the client's adversary.72 At the same time the client,
which used to be of commercial interest, has been turned into a potential financial
threat for the carrier.
Training
In a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with KLM the Dutch Government
agreed to provide training to KLM's employees concerning the validity and false-
ness of documents. If training is indeed provided by the government and how
much training is actually arranged in practice, is not completely clear. Apart from
agreements on training in MOUs, various EU Member States, including the
Netherlands, have deployed Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) abroad, espe-
cially in 'refugee-producing countries', to "reduce the number of improperly
documented passengers travelling from or through that country '73 and to ensure
that air carriers comply with the carriers' liability legislation. Since October 1994,
the Dutch Government started posting Immigration Liaison Officers who were
responsible for intensifying contacts with airlines and immigration authorities;
advising embassy personnel; providing training to airline personnel and conduct-
ing pre-boarding checks.74 The first placements of Dutch ILOs were in Colombo
(Sri Lanka), Moscow (Russia) and Accra (Ghana).
ILOs and Pre-Boarding Checks
In relation to the legislation on carriers, Dutch ILOs have the task to support and
advise airlines with regard to the validity of the travel documents of their passen-
gers; to provide basic training to airline personnel; and facilitate visits and train-
ing by specialists of the Dutch Government.75 They do not have the authority to
deny passengers access to a flight, they can only 'advise' airlines whether or not to
take a passenger on board, based on a check of the travel documents.76 The final
701) Translation derived from Staples 2000.
71) Guideline concerning criminal liability for the transportation of undocumented or improperly docu-
mented aliens, Official Gazette 1995, no. 59, p. 1 .
72) Ayling and Grabosky 2007, p. 427.
73) 'A code of conduct for Immigration Liaison Officers', IATA/Control Authorities Working Group
(IATA/CAWG) C0694/09/02. Immigration Liaison Officers are sometimes also referred to as Liaison
Officers (LO) or Airline Liaison Officers (ALO).
71) TK1995-1996, 19 637, no. 170, p. 2.
71) TK1999-2000, 26 732, no. 7, p. 90.
76) ACVZ 2003, p. 68.
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decision whether or not to carry a passenger lies with the airlines. If airlines flying
to the Netherlands act against negative advice from the Liaison Officer, this is
reported to the Dutch Royal (Military) Constabulary (KMar), the Border Police
at Schiphol Airport. 77 Subsequently, a gate check will be conducted at the plane's
arrival at Schiphol Airport.78 In this way, ILOs can influence and control whether
or not passengers, whose documentation raises questions, will be admitted to the
plane. How exactly the stationing and functioning of ILOs work is not very clear.
Although in theory ILOs have an advisory task, it is doubtful whether this is still
just 'advice' in practice; negative advice to airlines concerning certain passengers,
appears to be almost always followed. According to the Dutch Minister for Aliens
Affairs and Integration, ILOs have advised carriers in 3,500 cases in 2004. In over
99% of the cases the advice was followed by airlines. 79 KLM, the Royal Dutch
airline indicates that ILOs can be very helpful in advising carriers on documenta-
tion and that today, in many cases ILOs from different countries work together
in teams which are available in case an airline asks for assistance. It seems that this
is not only a way to control but also to support carriers.
Deploying Airline Liaison Officers has since 1996 also come into practice at
the EU level with the adoption of a Joint Action of 14 October 1996, providing
for a common framework for the initiatives of Member States concerning liaison
officers." Since this Joint Action, there have been several initiatives to coordinate
pre-frontier and to pool means and resources.81 The creation of a European ILO
network was referred to in the European Commission's Communication of
November 2001.82 Although all Member States agreed on the important role
ILOs carry out in the prevention and fight against illegal immigration in the
countries of origin and transit, and on the fact that this role should be further
increased, no agreement could be reached on streamlining the tasks and definition
11) The KMar are responsible for border control at Schiphol. Officials of the KMar have a wide variety of
duties. They are responsible for maintaining public order, for guarding members of the Royal Family,
crime prevention and also for enforcing the legislation on aliens.Concerning the legislation on aliens they
are, among other things, responsible for border control, but also for the reception of asylum-seekers, and
expelling failed asylum-seekers and irregular migrants.
71 Information to the Parliament by the Dutch Minister for Justice, TK2001-2002, 27 204, no. 15,
p. 8 .
79) TK2004-2005, 29 344 en 19 637, no. 43, p. 7.
80) Joint Action 96/602/JHA of 14 October 1996, OJ L 268 of 19 October 1996.
81) Joint position of the Council of 25 October 1996 on pre-frontier assistance and training assignments
(96/622/JHA OJL 281, 31.10.1996, pp. 1-2); Decision of the Schengen Convention Executive Com-
mittee of 16 December 1998 on coordinated deployment of document advisors for air and maritime
traffic and at consular representations (SCH/Com-ex (98) 59 rev.); Recommendation from the German
Presidency of 26 January 1999 on the establishment of round-the-clock document adviser bureaus at
problem airports with alternate participation of all EU member states (Doc. 5529/99); Network of Pre-
Frontier Liaison Officers (Doc. 9805/00, 28 June 2000).
'2) Communication on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, COM(2001) 672, 15 November
2 00 1, p. 16.
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of ILOs until 2004. According to the European Commission: "a legal basis for
such networks would formalise this cooperation and co-ordination by defining
their objectives and letting Member States know what information or services can
be expected or requested via them". 83
The lack of clarity that existed concerning the tasks and responsibilities of Liai-
son Officers, is reflected in "A Code of Conduct for Immigration Liaison Officers"
that was drawn up in October 2002 by IATA, the International Air Transport
Association. This document is concerned with the tasks and deployment of Immi-
gration Liaison Officers. Its goal is to promote consistency of approach and coop-
eration between Immigration Liaison Officers deployed by Member States
overseas.
In February 2004, a Council Regulation was adopted on the creation of an
Immigration Liaison Officers network. This Regulation obligates Member States
to establish forms of cooperation among ILOs.A It specifies what information
should be gathered by ILOs and how they should cooperate, for example they
shall "coordinate positions to be adopted in contacts with commercial carriers".85
Most recently, a Common Manual for Immigration Liaison Officers Posted
abroad by Member States of the European Union was drafted, which "is intended
to be an operational and/or practical tool comprising the best practices and all
kind of relevant information useful for the ILOs in order to carry out the com-
mon tasks defined in the ILO regulation".86
After the terrorist attacks on the United States and Madrid, many countries
swiftly introduced laws aimed at the fight against terrorism. The Netherlands
were no exception. The Dutch Government asked the ACVZ87 for advice on the
relationship between the policy concerning aliens and the fight against terrorism.
In their report, the Committee analyzed the role of Immigration Liaison Officers
and concluded that this can be considered an efficient way of checking immi-
grants before they access the carrier.
In Dutch policy, there is a lack of clarity concerning the use of the term 'pre-
boarding checks'. In some cases, this means checks executed by ILOs when assist-
ing airlines, at other times this also means the deployment of KMar officials at an
airport abroad, whereby KMar personnel are flown to a specific station for a short
period of time after which they return to the Netherlands. According to the
11) Communication on the development of a common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and
trafficking of human beings, external borders and the return of illegal residents, COM (2003) 323 final,
Brussels 3 June 2003.
14) Council Regulation (EC) no. 377/2004 of 19 February 2004, OJ L 64, p. 1, 2.03.04.
'5) Council Regulation (EC) no. 377/2004 of 19 February 2004, OJ L 64, p. 1, 2.03.04, Article 4(1),
indent 3.
'0 Draft Common Manual for Immigration Liaison Officers Posted abroad by Member States of the
European Union, Council Document 8418/06, 25.04.06.
87) Advisory Committee on Miens Affairs, see note 47.
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Dutch Government, in these cases the carrier is assisted in deciding whether or
not to transport passengers. Whether or not pre-boarding checks can be executed
depends on the authorisation of local authorities.8" It is not clear if and how
agreements are made with local authorities on pre-boarding checks. In this arti-
cle, the checks by KMar officials are referred to as pre-boarding checks. Although
it is not exactly clear how these pre-boarding checks have worked, this strategy
seems to have been deployed mainly on an ad hoc basis to counter certain trends
in illegal immigration flows or trends for example where there appears to be an
increase in the use of false documentation in a certain airport. In policy docu-
ments, it remains unclear if agreements have been made regarding such pre-
boarding checks with third countries, and how exactly these checks work. It seems
that these pre-boarding checks could support carriers in their control duties.
Gate-Checks
Whereas the posting of ILOs is a way of influencing and supporting carriers, gate-
checks are an instrument to 'monitor' their behaviour. Gate-checks of passengers'
documents are being conducted by immigration officers immediately after pas-
sengers have disembarked the plane or boat at the passenger bridge. That way,
undocumented passengers can be directly 'claimed with' the concerning carrier.89
This can act as an incentive for transporters to be zealous in their control efforts.
Moreover, executing a gate-check ensures that passengers, who are not in posses-
sion of proper documentation - for example, because they have been destroyed or
gotten rid of in the plane - can still be assigned to a country of origin or transit
and to a specific transporter. This means that it is clear for authorities which car-
rier can be fined, which carrier is responsible for re-transporting the passenger,
and to which country.
In the Netherlands, gate-checks have been in use since the 1980s when a pen-
alty system was not yet installed. It is not exactly clear how these gate-checks are
operated in practice; whether they are executed randomly or targeted at specific
'risk' flights. According to the Dutch Government, in case advice by an ILO is
not followed, this will be reported and a gate-check will be executed at Schiphol
Airport.
The practice of gate-checks does not mean that passengers do not need to pass
the immigration control desk to have their documents checked once more; gate-
checks are supplementary to, not a replacement for immigration controls.
Negotiating Parties I Memorandum of Understanding
Although the State has the power to control and to sanction, it seems that carriers
have not been silent 'victims' of this policy. The relationship between government
881) TK1999-2000, 26732, no. 7, p. 91.
89) The Dutch Government used this terminology.
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and carrier is not a one-sided relationship judging from the negotiations and
court cases on this issue. One example is the way the Dutch government has been
negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the Royal Dutch Airline
(KLM) since the instalment of the penalty system.
Although a penalty system for carriers had come into force in 1994, it was not
until 1 December 1997 that fines were actually imposed on transporters.9" The
government preferred to prevent carriers from bringing in undocumented pas-
sengers based on solid agreements. Imposing fines to reach this objective was
considered a remedy of last resort.9' This changed in 1997.
On 16 February 1997, an airplane from Turkmenistan Airlines landed at
Schiphol Airport carrying 173 undocumented Tamil passengers.9 2 Although the
phenomenon of undocumented passengers was not new - during the previous
three years, about 10,000 undocumented passengers were transported to Schiphol
Airport every year, of which about 60 per cent requested asylum 93 - this was
nonetheless cause for some consternation in the Dutch Parliament. 4 As a result
of this consternation in Parliament and the growing attention regarding inadmis-
sible passengers, the State Secretary of Justice made an inventory of the numbers
of inadmissible passengers arriving at Schiphol Airport in 1996, which showed
that 55 per cent of the inadmissible passengers arriving at Schiphol Airport wished
to claim asylum, of which 74 per cent did not have any travel documentation.
As of 20 October 1997, a trial period started; at the end of this trial period,
from 1 December 1997,95 carriers acting in breach of their duty of due care would
be fined. The first fines were imposed on various airlines. The Dutch Royal Air-
line had received most of the fines, which was not unexpected since it is the big-
gest airline flying to and from Schiphol Airport. Between 1 December 1997 and
12 April 1998, more than 4,000 reports were made by the KMar against KLM for
transporting undocumented passengers. 96 These criminal cases were then trans-
ferred to the Public Prosecutors Office. The joint cases went to court and were
finally decided by the Supreme Court in 2000. 97 KLM lost the court case and had
to pay a fine of approximately 4.5 million Euros. Other airlines that had been
fined had accepted settlements. The court case against KLM shows that this car-
rier did not - at least not in all cases - obediently follow the carrier sanctions
regime, by accepting financial sanctions; instead it contested these sanctions and
objected to this policy.
90) Aanhangsel TK1997-1998, no. 1208, p. 2471.
91) Aanhangsel TK1995-1996, no. 914, p. 1857.
92) TK 1996-1997, 25 237, 'Landing of an airplane from Turkmenistan at Schiphol Airport', no. 1-3
and TK1997-1998, 19 637 / 25 237, no. 303.
93) TK1996-1997, 25 237, no. 2, p. 1.
94) TK1996-1997, 25 386 and 19 637, no. 23. Motion of 26 June 1997.
95) TK1997-1998, 19 637, no. 303, p. 8.
90 Aanhangsel TK1997-1998, no. 1208, p. 2471.
97) Supreme Court LJN AA6456, 112 986, 11 July 2000, NJ 2002/373.
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Before the court case against KLM had come to an end, the Dutch Govern-
ment had started talks with KLM to come to an alternative solution. As a result,
the Memorandum of Understanding described above, was negotiated and signed
in 2000. This MoU came into force on 1 April 2000.9 According to the text of
the agreement, the intention of the MoU was to achieve the goals of the legisla-
tion "as much as this is reasonably possible". The agreement was signed in order
to regulate compliance with the legislation in the first instance with a Memoran-
dum of Understanding, so that criminal prosecution would not need to be used.
In the MoU, it was agreed that KLM would comply with the carrier legislation
by checking before every flight whether the passengers were in possession of the
proper travel documents. Moreover, the airline agreed to allow, at all times, Dutch
officials to advise KLM's employees at airports of departure when checking docu-
ments. Further, it was agreed that KLM would be responsible for making sure
that its employees responsible for checking travel documents would have sufficient
expertise and knowledge with regard to these travel documents. KLM would also
ensure that technical appliances would be available in order to check the relevant
documents. The Dutch Government, in turn, would provide training and exper-
tise to KLM employees concerning the recognition of false /falsified documents.
In this MoU, targets were also set; a quota was established concerning the num-
bers of undocumented or inadequately documented passengers that the Dutch
airline could carry without being criminally prosecuted. The objective was to
diminish the quota for each category every year, eventually the number of 'inad-
missible' passengers transported by KLM should only be 215 in 2003.
According to the State Secretary of Justice, the Dutch Government signed the
Memorandum of Understanding with KLM to increase the 'duty of due care' of
the airline. The government reasoned that by providing the airline with expertise
in recognising false papers, its duty of due care would become more extensive and
thus the criminal liability would become greater. By increasing the liability and
the expertise of the airline, the government hoped to improve the supervision by
carriers of passenger documents, 99 while for KLM it has served as a way to avoid
being fined. The Dutch Government did impose fines on carriers: in 2002, fines
were imposed totalling C 560,000. l°° It is not specified which airlines were con-
cerned. In 2004, the KMar sent official reports concerning 1,112 refused passen-
gers to the Public Prosecutors Office. In 2004, the Prosecutors Office offered
settlements to 58 airlines concerning their negligence in breaching the duty of
due care, totalling E 760,000.°1
An agreement was only made with KLM regarding the transport of undocu-
mented passengers, which illustrates the special position of KLM. Other airlines
981) TK 1999-2000, 19 637, Annex to no. 502 (Memorandum of Understanding).
99) TK45 3402, 3 February 2000.
100) TK2003-2004, 29 344, no.1 Terugkeernota, p. 11.
101) See 5396579/DVB 28 February 2006, p. 19.
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have argued before the cantonal court that the Public Prosecutor's Office gives
KLM preferential treatment; KLM has not been charged after signing the MoU,
while other air carriers that have made the same efforts have been charged. These
airlines have further complained that their requested consultation with the Public
Prosecutor had not yet been realised. Therefore, these carriers argue that the Pub-
lic Prosecutor's Office, being aware of these circumstances, should drop the
charges against them. The cantonal court dismissed this reasoning arguing that it
is up to the Public Prosecutor to decide whether or not arrangements should be
made concerning these offences or their prevention. The cantonal court took into
consideration that Schiphol Airport is KLM's home base and KLM is the Dutch
'home carrier'. According to the cantonal court, this provides enough justification
to apply a different prosecution policy to KLM. °2
Negotiating Parties II
The previous paragraph demonstrates that KLM and the Department of Justice
have engaged in negotiations on the obligations concerning the checking of pas-
sengers. That the relationship between the Dutch State and carriers is not one-
sided is also illustrated by two other examples. The first is the fact that carriers
seem to have been involved in the implementation of the Advanced Passenger
Information Directive (2004/82/EC). In the Netherlands, the implementation of
this Directive was not completed until July 2007,103 while the deadline for trans-
position was 5 September 2006. The Minister of Justice informed Parliament that
implementation was late, partly because of the necessity of deliberation with the
carriers involved on the way the passenger data would be transmitted, and the
way in which passengers would be informed about the policy.*0 4 The Minister of
Justice did not make clear what exactly was meant by 'deliberation'.
With regard to expulsion policy, air carriers also play a role. Return policies
today are made a priority in the migration policy of European States and are
regarded as integral parts of migration policy. This means also that here carriers
have an important task. The Dutch Government, to implement a successful return
policy, is also dependent on the willingness of air carriers to help in expulsions.'05
This provides carriers with an important position in the expulsion process.
102) LJN BA2584 and LJN BA2586, 5 April 2007.
103) Stb. (Official Journal) 2007, 252 and Stb. 2007, 283.
104) TK30 897, 8 February 2007, no. 5, p. 1.
05") Carriers are responsible for re-transporting those inadmissibles they had brought to the country.
However, there are also many expulsions of migrants who did not arrived with a carrier. In many cases
theses persons will need to be expelled by airplane, making governments dependent on the willingness of
airlines to transport those deportees.
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4. From Command and Control to Governance?
In this article, we have reflected on the involvement of private carriers in immigra-
tion control; focusing on the situation in practice and on the mode of regulation
in the Netherlands. Putting immigration control in context influences the kind of
regulatory strategy used. The question central is this paper was whether we can
discern a shift from command and control regulatory structures to governance.
The focus has been in the first instance on the role of the State as the initiator
in the carrier sanctions policy and the carrier as the 'victim' on who the policy is
being imposed. From this limited exploration of the carrier liability regime, it has
become clear that relationships between actors involved are changing due to the
development of this policy.
The term 'carrier sanctions' implies that mainly command and control instru-
ments in the sense of negative sanctions are used in forcing private transport
companies to perform the checking of passengers' documentation. The policy,
however, is broader. Various characteristics of command and control forms of
regulation exist in carrier sanctions policy; there are multiple mechanisms to
stimulate (command) and check (control) the actions of the carrier. The carrier
sanctions policy in that way constitutes a system of 'contiguous measures', coerc-
ing the gatekeeper into mandatory action. In order to solve the principal-agent
problem: pre-boarding checks are used to advise, gate-checks to monitor, and
sanctions to penalise when, after all, the carrier did not comply. These control
measures are a combination between 'hard touch' and 'soft touch' regulation.
Some aspects of the policy signal a shift towards governance. It can be stated
that the involvement of actors other than governments alone is already a move
towards a more de- centred way of governing. Gilboy's study suggests that com-
plex interdependencies can exist between various actors in third-party liability
systems;° 6 this is supported by the example of the Memorandum of Understand-
ing which KLM had negotiated with the Justice Department. This has been a
delicate process. In the Netherlands, a fine of 4.5 million Euros had been imposed
before parties could come to an agreement. In the MoU, agreements were made
and structures of deliberation were set up, stimulating forms of cooperation
between authorities and the airline. In the case of KIM, therefore, the carrier
sanctions policy has developed from a command and control type of regulation
towards a form of governance in which there is much cooperation and delibera-
tion, although sanctions can still be imposed. The question remains whether this
move toward governance can also be discerned in dealings with other airlines.
Government regulation concerning carrier sanctions seems to be hybrid. The
carrier sanctions policy in the Netherlands constitutes a combination of hard and
0 Gilboy 1997.
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soft touch regulations; a combination of advising, monitoring, training, negotiating
and sanctioning. Both a command and control approach and a governance
approach can be discerned. Besides using these mechanisms, the Dutch State
itself is still executing border controls supplementary to the controls executed by
carriers. In short, the Dutch Government has not moved from rowing to steering
but instead is doing part of the rowing and the steering.
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